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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study proposed that guilt proneness and anxiety proneness
are best regarded as separate constructs, and that they differ in their
relationships 'With field independence, locus of control, empatey, and
religiosity.

Furthermore, it attempted to integrate the concept of

guilt proneness into a 'Wider theoretical network for each sex.
Gullt is regarded as a sig:nificant aspect of life by various
disciplines, e.g., contemporary literature (Brown, 1973}, existential
philosophy (Morano, 1973), theology and religion (McConahay & Hough,
1973)·

In psychology, guilt has frequently been considered as undesirable:

as the bitter price paid for conmrunity living (Freud, 1930), or as a
neurotic symptom (Campbell, 1975).

Recently two trends have developed:

first several authors have suggested that guilt can have a constructive
effect b.r ooti.vating desirable changes in behavior or b.r increasing one's
sensitivity to others (Campbell, 1975; Hoffman, 1970; ~nrdnger, 1973;
Mowrer, ·1966); second, empirical. research a rout guilt has been sti.mula.ted
by the development of psychometrica.J.J..y sound instruments {Cattell, 1973;

Evans, Jessup, & Hearn, 1975; Mosher, 1966, 1968; Otterbacher & Munz,
\

1973).
When considered as a constructive influence, guilt is probably
better conceptualized not in psychoanalytic terms as a derivative of the
oedipal problem, but as one aspect of mora1 development within the contexi
1
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of total personality development.

In this approach moral responses

(including guilt), which originally developed out of fear associated with
atte:q>ts to obtain certain satisfactions, may continue to exist for quite
different reasons.

Secondly, this approach provides a better theoretical

framework for understanding the rational formation and reappraisal of
moral values and behavior during adolescence and adulthood (Bieber, 1972;
Erlkson, 1964; Hartman, 196o).

Several persona.li ty characteristics seem

to be especially relevant to the development and functi.oning of moral
understanding, namely, field independence (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson,
Goodenough, & Karp, 1962}, locus of control (Rotter, 1966), empathy
(Hogan, 1969), and religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975).

At the same

time, guilt is often discussed in terms of, or in relation to, anxiety.
The present study examined the relationship of guilt

pronenes~~~

(Mosher, 1966, 1968) and anxiety proneness (Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1970) to these personality characteristics.

It proposed that

guilt proneness and anxiety proneness cli.ffer from each other, and differ
in their relationships to the personality variables.

The investigation

of sex differences is included not because women may be more guilt prone
than men (Heying, Korabik, & Mlmz, 1975), but because they differ on the

other personality variables and, possibly, on previous conditioning
regarding apecific moral issues.

For example, women may be more

stringently controlled by external norms {Heying & Munz, 1974) • Hence,
it is not clear whether the other personality variables included here
are related to guilt in the same way for men and women.
variables

an4

The personality

several hypotheses are discussed in the following section.

CHAPTER II

REV!Pli OF RELATED LITERATURE
Guilt

Several prelimi.nary notions may help to clarify the meaning of
guilt proneness, its definition, and relationship to other forms or
anxiety.

fust, guilt has 'been considered previously from variollS
perspect1.ves, frequently with some degree of arbitrariness, and usually
in terms or resistance to temptation, self-criticism, remorse after

transgression, confession, expiation, and/or punishment.

Second, guilt

is ordinarily considered objective if' it follows actual or intended
wrongdoing; neurotic if it genera.lly follows the mere thought or fantasy
about wrongdoing; existential i f it refiects a sense of' cosmic disproportion between what is and what ought to be.

Third, guilt is considered

a form of moral anxiety, a regulating force, a superego style; in this
it is similar to shame (Lewis, 1971).

However, guilt is said to differ

from shame for several reasons: guilt involves a conflict between the ego
and the superego, whereas shame involves a conflict between the ego and
the ego-ideal (Piers & Singer, 1953); also, guilt illV'olves internal.
sanctions, whereas shame is a response to external sanctions alone
\

(Ausubel, 1955); finally, guilt and shame are related to empirically
differentiated a~tive styles (lewis, 1971; Smith, 1972).

' can be measured in a global way, i.e., total guilt
Fourth, guilt
3 .

4
feelings across several different situations, or in a specific wa:y,
i.e., guilt over particular issues.

Mosher (1966, 1968) differentiated

specific areas of guilt, namely, sex, aggression, and morality-conscience.
Others indicate that a global measure is rot theoretically useful (Fiske,
1971) and lacks empirical support (Mi.schel, 1974). Within specific
content areas there is a further question aoout the relationship between
resistance to temptation and reoorse after transgression.

Psychoanalytic

theory suggests a positive relationship based on the notion that
resistance is motivated by the desire to avoid the pain of guilt.

How-

ever, only slight suppo:rt has been found for this relationship (Becker,
1964; Johnson, Ackerman, & Frank, 1968).

Hoffman's (1970) theory of

"dynamic consistency" may provide some clarification, suggesting that
resistance and remorse {as typifying the post-transgression reaction) ·are positively related only in regard to a specific content area and
only at a certain level of maturity.

The present writer suggests that

this may not result until the end of adolescence, perhaps due to a
particular kind of stabtlization (Kohl berg & Kramer, 1969).
Fif'th, a meaningful distinction can be made between state guilt,
i.e., the transitory feeling of the moment, and trait guilt, i.e., a
relatively stable disposition or tendency to respond in a certain way.
Spielberger (1966, l972a) has summarized
in the stuqy of anxiety.

~he

value of this distinction

Mosher (1968) and Okel

a similar distinction regarding guilt.

and·l~sher

(1968) made

In particular, they described

trait guilt as an acquired di.sposi tion to avoid gutlt-inducing behaviors
or to respond to committed transgressions with state guilt.

M:>sher

includes both resistance and remorse in accord with psychoanalytic theory.

----------~-------~------~-

Without del:a.ting the theory, the same combination seems feasible in
terms of Hoffman's (1970) theory of dynamic consistency.

Otterbacher

and Munz (1973) also developed measures of state and trait guilt,
describing the latter as a generalized self-concept derived from the
subjective averaging of the individual's perception of his guilt states.
lbsber focuses on a cognitive aspect of trait guilt, while Otterbacher
and Munz focus on an affective aspect.

Jbth constructs have some

validity; however, Janda and Magri (1975) fomd no empirical relationship beween them and concluded that they are independent aspects of
trait guilt.
FinaJ.ly, since the ti.Ina of Freud (1930) , guilt has been discussed

in relation to anxiety (fear).

This relationship bas 'teen explained in

various ways, not always with a great deal of clarity.

Perhaps a brief'

description of' several theoretical positiona regarding guilt and anxiety
as states can provide a background f'or discussing their relationship as
traits.

According to Mandler and Watson (1966) guUt and anxiety are

basically the same because they involve the interruption of' an organized
response sequence without offering an alternative; however, they are
given different labels because they arise in different situations.
".Anxious guilt" results when one's continuing efforts to right (i.e.,
un-do) a wrong are interrupted, but no alternatives are available; as a
result the individual is left feeling helpless.

Izard (1972) concep-

tualizes anxiety as a pattern of emotions, as an unstable and variable
combination of interacting fundamental emotions (e.g., fear, anger,

guilt, distress).

Guilt is mt the same as fear, but occurs only as a

component of a larger anxiety pattern, in which fear is always domtnant.

6

Freud described both the origin and continuing experience of guilt as
based on fear.

At first, there is fear of parental punishment and of

losing parental love; later, fear of a critical and punishing superego
develops, as well as fear of the larger society which takes the place
of the parents. Final.l.y, other authors col'lBider guilt and anxiety as
different constructs, but suggest that they are frequently found togather.

This occurs because the laboratory or real-life situation,

which involves guilt over wrongdoing, also includES either a further threat
to the integrity of the self-concept ('Epstein, 1972) or the added
uncertainty of external. punishment (Gardner, 1970); the latter dimensions
occasion the anxiety.
Some of the difficulty in defining and differentiating guilt and
..._...,.

anxiety as states is also apparent in their analysis as traits.

~.

Previous

research has been conflicting, but tends to support a distinction between
guilt proneness and anxiety proneness.

Lowe (1964) , using the Taylor

Manifest Anxiety Scale and a similar MMPI-based guilt scale, found a very
high correlation and concluded that the two col'l5tructs, as measured by'
self-report, are equivalent.

Levitt (1967) concluded in his brief review

that the anxious personal.ity is much given to guilt.

Cattell and Scheier

(1961) found that "guilt proneness" loaded on trait anxiety.

However,

contrary to the Freudian view, a "strong superego 11 was not related to
anxiety among normal subjects, even though it might be related among
maladjusted patients.

Note that "guilt proneness" is understood not as

a liability to pangs of guilt, but as a global sel'l5e of inadequacy,
loneliness, and tears (Cattell, 1973).

Finally, M>sher (1966) found that

among male subjects trait anxiety, measured by' the Manifest Anxiety Scale,
was not related to his measure of total guilt, nor to specific measures of

7

hostility guilt or morality-conscience guilt; although it was related
negatively to a specific measure or sex guilt.

Later a positive

relationship was round between hostility guilt and anxi.ety measured by
the Welsh .Anxiety subscale of' the MMPI (Knott, Lasater, & Shuman, 1974).
In summa:ry, trait guilt and trait anxiety are described in three

different ways: as equivalent, as positively related, and as independent.
Although IDwe's (1964) measure or guilt is relatively unknown, Cattell

(1973), Mosher (1966) and Knott et al. (1974) indicated that the picture
is not clear, at least among male subjects.

The ab:Jenoe or a relation-

ship between anxiety and total guilt becomes rather meaningless i f sex
guilt and hostility guilt are round related in opposite ways to anxiety.
The positive relationship between Cattell's (1973) "guilt proneness" and
trai. t anxiety is not nurprising, and does not contradict the previous
statement.

The interpretation or that scale, together with evidence

that it loads with abasement on a !actor independent or trait guilt
(Schwartz, 1973), suggests that "guilt proneness" may not focus on moral
guilt.

In view or the preceding discussion, the present study was
concerned with an objective understanding or guilt, conceptualized as a
disposition within specific content areas roth to resist temptation or,
after transgression, to engage in sell-criticism, remorse, confession, or
expiation (Mosher,

1966, 1968).

were considered synoeymous.

The terms trait guilt and guilt proneness

Guilt proneness was operationally defined by

the MOsher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory, which includes separate forms
for men and women, and provides a score for total guilt, as well as for
sex guilt, hostility guilt, and morality-conscience guilt.

p
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The uncertain relationship between trait guilt and trait anxiety
in the previous studies, which did not include a female sample, indicates
the need f'or further clarification.

The present stuey- examined the

relationship between trait guilt and trait anxiety (Spielberger et al.,
1970) with male and female subjects.

Trait anxiety refers to relatively

stable individual differences in anxiety proneness.

It was considered

as an acquired predisposition both to view the world in a particular
way and to respond in situations perceived as threatening with conscious
feelings of' tension and apprehension, and with heightened autonomic
nervous system activity.

Spielberger's (1972b) theory suggests that

subjects high on trait anxiety are more self-depreciating, perceive a
wider range o:r situations as threatening, and become particularly
apprehensive in situations that involve failure or loss of' self-esteem.
Conceivably, such individuals may experience increased state anxiety
when confronted with a temptation or moral transgression; perhaps they
tend to develop a chronic sense of' guilt which borders on the neurotic;
however, they do not seem likely to score very high on a cognitive
'--

measure of trait guilt.

At the same time, as Erlkson (1964) noted, the

mature "ethical'' sense presupposes an earlier mrality which was based
on fear of' threats (including both punishment and the inner sense of'
guilt).

Some residual effects of this morality may still be operative.
It was eypothesized that trait guilt and trait anxiety are

different constructs, being either statistically independent or only
slightly related.

Secondly, since increased sexual arousal is accompanied

by increased anxiety in female (Mosher & Greenberg, 1969) but not in male

subjects (Schill, 1972a), it was hypothesized that anxiety and sex guilt

...
9
are positively related among female but not among male subjects.

Other

relationships and sex differences were also explored.
At the same time, certain individuals are considered to be IOOre
guilt prone than others (Izard, 1972; Snith, 1972).

This does not mean

that the latter individuals would necessarily be involved in IOOre immoral.
behavior, but that they have different reasons, e.g., shame or .fear, for
resisting temptation or feeling unpleasant after transgression.
P!lcbologica1 Differentiation
Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin et al., 1962; Witkin, Oltman,
Raskin, & Karp, 1971) conceptualize psychological differentiation as a
single 1mderlying process of development toward greater
complexity.

psychologica.~

lbre basic and more pervasive than a cognitive style,

th~..::

level of differentiation is an influential determinant in tnal.G" areas,
e.g., perception, cognition, body concept, sense of separate identity,
and nature of defenses.
The theory rests upon voluminous research which began in the
area of spatial perception (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman, Ma.cbover, Meissner,
& Wapner, 1954) on tasks that required the disembedding of an element

.from its surrounding field.

Those dominated by the organization of the

field and perceiving the parts of the field as fused are said to perceive
in a field-dependent way.

Those experienoing the parts of the field as

discrete from the organized ground are said to perceive in a fieldindependent way.

AB a result of research in other areas the field-

dependent approach is described as diffuse, global, and dominated b,r the
field, whereas the field-independent approach is
articulate, and ing?osing structure.

describe~

as detailed,

Eventually these differences were

10
encompassed within the construct of differentiation which represents a.
developmental continuum characterized by increasing specialization.
Witkin et al. (1971) summarized their position as follows:
Thus we consider it more differentiated if, in his perception
of the world, the person perceives parts of the field as
discrete and the field as structured • • • if, in his concept
of his body, the person has a definite sense of the boundaries
of the body and the interrelation among its parts • • • if the
person has a feeling of himself as an individual distinct from
others and bas internalized, developed standards to guide his
view of the world and of himself • • • if the defenses the
person uses are specialized. It is reasonable to believe that
these various characteristics, which we have found to cluster
together, are not the end products of development in separate
channels, but are diverse expressions of an underlying process
of development toward greater psychological complexity.
(p. 9-10)

Despite problems al::out the meaning of differentiation (Nisbett
& Temoshok, 1976; Wachtel, 1972), about the single (Ada.ms, 1974; l'Tit~ .
& Berry, 1975) or multiple (Bergman & :Ehglebrektson, 1973) factor

structure of the rod-and-frame test or the em'tedded figures test, and
about the adequacy of certain measures (.Arbuthnot, 1972), the theory has
stimulated an immense amount of research and

data.

SJ~Uthesized

a wide range of

This includes several important aspects of moral development:

internalization of principles (Witkin et al., 1962), moral reasoning
(.Arbuthnot, 1974; Schleifer & Douglas, 1973), role playing (Fu.tterer,

1973), and empathy (Martin & Toomey, 1973).

In particular, the theory

makes certain predictions, which have received some support, about shame,
guilt, and anxiety (Lewis, 1971; Witkin et aJ.., 1962; Witkin, Lewis, &
WeU, 1968).
First, there are

s~ilarities

between field-independent

functioni.ng and the experience of guilt.

The field-independent individual

is more capable than the field-dependent of disembedding himself from

11

his surroundings (including other persons), of using internalized
standards to evaluate himself rather than looking to others for approval
and evaluation (Pearson, 1972; Willoughby, 1967) 1 of separating his
thoughts from his feelings, of experiencing articulated rather than
global affect.

Guilt, in turn, involves internal standards rather than

comparisons with the standards and expectations of others 1 considers
self the judge rather than real or imagined others, requires a more
ideational focus on the specific act and making amends rather than a
diffuse focus on the whole self as 'being inferior or ashamed (Witkin
et al. t 1968).

In view or these similarities, field-independent

individuals seem to be more guilt prone than field-dependent individuals.
Witkin et al. (1968) found some support for this relationship in
their study or the affective reactions, i.e., state guilt, of eight
neurotic patients during the first two sessions of psychotherapy.

How-

ever, these results may 'be 1imi ted to the therapeutic situation, to the
first few sessions of therapy, or to neurotic subjects.

Therefore,

further research with normal subjects is indicated.
Second, Witkin et al. (1962) originally presented some evidence
that the less structured defense system or the field-dependent person
would lead to greater expression of anxiety.

However, a later study

conf'irmed an apparently different hypothesis 1 namely, that fieldindependent and field-dependent patients would not differ regarding the
total amount or anxiety expressed, but that field-dependent patients
would express more diffuse anxiety, because or th8 global quality of
their atrective experience (vli tkin et al., 1968).

Other studies with

12-year-old and adult subjects of both sexes failed to find a relationship between the Hidden Figures Test and ti."'' measures or anxiety, the

jiiP
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Manifest Anxiet,y Scale and the Institute for Personalit.1 and Abilit,y
Testing Anxi.et,y Sca1e (Dargel & Kirk, 1973; Joshi, 1974).

Hence, there

seems to be no relationship between field independence and trait anxiety,
and a negative relationship between field independence and the expression

ot diffuse anxiety.
In the present study', therefore, it was cypothesized that guilt

and anxiety are related to field independence in different ways among
normal subjects: Field independence is positively related to trait guilt,
and either negatively related to, or independent of, trait anxiety.
The scope of differentiation theory necessitates the study of

other variables that may moderate the relationship with gutlt and
anxiety.

Two such variables are locus or control and empathy.

Each has
-.~

been discussed in relation to field independence and both appear to be
related to guilt and anxiety.
!Deus or Control
Szasz (197.3) and l~enninger (1973) described a tendency or some
individuals ro explain away the reality of evil, the fact of man's
inhumanity to man.

These persons are said to blame external. forces--

the devil, mental illness, whatever--ro avoid accepting personal

responsibility and its concomitant obligation of asserting as much
rational control as possible (Pittel, 1960).

These authors present no

empirica1 evidence; however, there seem to be similarities between their
ideas and some ot the research connected w:i.. th locus of control.
According to Rotter (1966) people differ in the degree to which
they attribute positive or negative reinforcement to their own efforts
or to outside forces.

Internal control refers to the perception of

13
reinforcing events as consequences of one 's own behavior and, there by,
under personal control.

External control refers to the perception that

events are 'Uili'elated to one 1 s behavior and, thus, beyond personal
control.

In Rotter 1 s theory of personality this belief or expectancy

is an essential element in determining the probability of a particular
behavior.

This construct bas stimulated a great deal of research and

its influence is recognized in a variety of situations (Lefcourt,

1966,

1972}.
There are direct and indirect reasons for suggesting that the
notion of personal control, of felt effectiveness, is related to such·
behavior as resistance to temptation and remorse, etc., after transgression.

First, among the indirect reasons, internals regard their

behavior as the cause of certain consequences.

They perceive a strongsr

link between intention and outcome than externals do.

For example,

internals were found to assume greater responsibility for the consequences
of their behavior (Phares, Wilson, & Klyver, 1971) and to engage in more
self-blame after receiving negative evaluation than externals ch (Davis
& Davis, 1972}.

Secondly, locus of control does influence the attribution

of responsibility for a "bad deed," at least in regard to others.

Thus,

Sosis (1974) fomd that internals hold a person more responsible and
judge him more harshly for an accident than externals do.

Externals, on

the other hand, seem to believe that if people are not masters of their
fate, then a person who commits a negative act is not necessarily
responsible for the effects of that act.

These studies, although not

in the specific area of personal moral behavior, do emphasize the

pertinent elements of placing responsibility and engaging in self-criticism.
Thus, they indirectly suggest a relationship between locus of control and

....
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guilt.
Direct evidence for this relationship and the presence of a sex
difference is indicated in three studies.

Johnson et al. (1968) used

separate global measures of resistance and remorse, which were based on
eight projective stories, to test the hypothesis that internals are
higher on resistance because of their greater tendency to delay
gratification.

They found male internals higher on resistance and on

remorse, but found no relationship among female subjects.

Adams-Webber

(1969) used a global measwe of moral sanctions, which was based on two
projective stories, to test the hypothesis that internals would emphasize
self-blame and guilt feelings because these depend only on the individual's
judgment and are directly contingent upon the inmoral act whereas externals
.

,~

~·

would emphasize detection and punishment, or even deny personal l:il.ame.- ~·In
support of the J:zypothesis, highly significant differences were found
between the sanctions described by internals and externals.

However, he

found no sex differences, noted the discrepancy with Johnson et al. 's
stuey, and recommended further research to resolve the ambiguity.
Finally, Schwartz (1973) with no specific hypothesis tested the "unclear"

relationship between total guilt on the Mosher True-False Gull t Inventory
and locus of control.

He found a slight tendency for externals to be

higher on guilt with a combined sample of male and female subjects.
Schwartz's (1973) results do not fit the previous theoretica:L
description or research.

Inasmuch as Schwartz did not offer art3' comment

or explanation, it remains unclear to the present writer why externals
were higher on guilt.

Possibly this is a case in which the generalized

expectancy of locus of control is outweighed by a specific expectancy
regarding the moral situation.

That is, negative reinforcements related

--to immoral behavior may be so well learned that they have greater
influence than locus of control.

For this reason externals may score

higher on a measure of conventional morality.
The present study repeated Schwartz 1 s study, but also included
specific measures of guilt and the necessary control for sex differences
(Johnson et al., 1968).

It was hypothesized that male internals score

higher on total guilt than externals.

No predictions were made aoout

female subjects.
In addition, several studies indicated that the combl.nation of

differentiation and locus or control, which are statistically independent
(Wcourt & Telegdi, 1971; Rotter, 1966; strahan & Huth, 1975), led to
more precise predictions across several cognitive, perceptual, and
personality 1n.easures (Lefcourt, Gronnerud, & l1cD:>nald, 1973; Tobacyk,
Broughton, & Vaught, 1975).

=

Lefcourt and Telegdi suggested that certain

combinations are congruent (i.e., field-independent internals, fielddependent externals), while others are incongruent (i.e., field-independent
externals, field-dependent internals) • The congruent groups performed more
effective:cy on cognitive and perceptual tasks and were better adjusted
according tD an actual-self/ideal-self Q-sort.
of the field-independent internals.

This was particul.arly true

Tobaeyk et al. suggested further

research to determine how pervasive a com"ai.ned 1'perceptual expectancr"
style may be.

The prese11t study, therefore, explored this style in

relation to guilt.

In view of the earlier discussion and the present

notion of congruency, it was hypothesized that field-independent internals
score higher on gullt than the

ot.~er

groups.

Regarding anxiety, a number of studies indicated that externals
are more anxious than internals, at least on measures such as the Manif'est

p
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Anxiet.Y Scale and the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing
Anxiet,y Scale, apparently because they more often appraised the world as
a place in which they cannot complete organized sequences of behavior
(Watson, 1967) or lack control over reinforcing events (Id.chtenstein &
Keutzer, 1967; Ray & Katahn, 1968; Strassberg, 1973).

Others found no

relationship between locus of control and a nonobtrusive measure of
social anxiet,y (Donovan, Smith, Paige, & O'Leary, 1975).

In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety

are related to locus of control in different ways: Internals are more
prone to guilt than externals and externals are more prone to anxiety
than internaJ.s.

.Also, since field-independent internals show signs

contraindicating anxiet,y, namely, higher cognitive performance and better
adjustment, they were hypothesized to be less prone to anxiet.Y than ·tne
other groups.
Previous research indicated that predictions based on the Rotter

I-E scale may be weak because the scale is multidimensional (Collins,

1974; Joe, 1971; Klockars & Varnum, 1975; Mi.rels, 1970; Strahah & Ruth,
1975; Viney, 1974). Mirels found two factors which are similar for male
and female subjects: first, a belief concerning felt mastery over the
course of one's life; second, a belief concerning the extent to which one
is capable of exerting an impact on political institutions.

Other

investigations have found similar factors (Strahan & Ruth, 1975; Viney,

1974). Presumably, Mtrels' first factor has greater relevance in the
present stud¥.

Its influence, therefore, is noted.

l!S>atb;y
Although differentiation refers to the overall complexit,r of the
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psychological system and locus of control refers to a cognitive belief,
empathy represents an affective dimension which is theoretically important
and is related to guilt and anxiety in different ways.

In general, empathy

refers to an awareness and sensitivity regarding the needs and feelings of
others, to an ability to "stand in the shoes of the other." Within a moral
perspecttve, empath;y refers to the consideration of the implications of
one's behavior for others.
Various theories incorporate the notion of empathy.

Within a neo-

a.nalytic framework, Bieber (1972) emphasized the need to include compassion
as a nonsuperego fu.TJ.ction but an essential element in moral man.

Kohl berg 1 s

(1969) stages or moral reasoning reflect an expanding capacity to take the
role of the other.

Hogan (1969, 1973) listed empathy as one of the f'ive

dimensions necessary to explain moral development and conduct.

Hoffman:: s

(1970, 1973) theory rests ultimately upon the capacity to experience the
inner states of others and to transform empathic distress into sympathetic
concern for others.

For Hoffman, guilt is sympathetic distress over

another's distress, with the realization that one has .freely caused that
distress.

Fina.J.:cy, i f altruism may be considered positive moral behavior,

empathy is considered a major determinant in this area (Berkowitz, 1972;
Krebs, 1975) •
The empathic person focuses mt so much on moral rules and
prohibitions, as on persons and how they are affected by his behavior.
Perhaps empat.l'zy" specifies a particular kind of internal.ization, i.e., a
felt understanding of what it is about certain actions that makes them
i.mtnora1.

The empathic person's deeper awareness of' the needs and feelings

or others, and how they may be affected, may lead to greater resistance
and, in the case of transgression, to greater remorse.

This seems
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particularly true regarding hostility.
Anxiety and empathy appear to be negatively related.

The anxious

person is preoccupied with his own needs, fears and uncertainties; hence,
he is less like)Jr to place himself imaginatively' in the position or the
other.

Hogan (1969), using his empathy scale and the Mlni.:rest Anxietq

Scale, found a negative relationshi.p for medical school applicants and
a nonsignificant relationship for college female subjects; using the
MMPI Anxiety scale, he found a negative relationship for both groups.
Also, Hekmat, Khajavi, and Mehryar {1975), using the empathy scale and
the Lanton Psychological Screening Inventory, found a slight negative
relationship for both male and female subjects.
In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety

are related to empathy in different ways: guilt in a positive way,
anxiety in a negative way.

-:~

Also, a positive relationship was predicted

between empathy and hostility guilt.
Furthermore, empathy is positively related to differentiation,
at least a100ng mal.e subjects (Martin & Toomey, 1973) •

However, Witki.n

et al. (1962) suggested that only some field-independent individuals are
genuinely enpathic and others have a philosophical interest in values and
lack interest in people.

Perhaps empathy moderates the relationship

between differentiation and guilt, with more empathic field-independent
subjects being higher on guilt than less empathic ones.

This possibilitu

was explored in the present study.
Religiosity
In the popular mind, as Wright (1971) noted, there is an assump-

tion that religion makes people better behaved than they would be wi. thout
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it.

This ass'lU'IIPtion is probably based on people's experience with, or

about, religion: most religions propose a roral code to guide and
evaluate behavior; religion is frequently used to motivate behavior, to
strengthen prohibitions, to provide sanctions; religion supports
conventional morality.

However, in the scientific mind the relationship

between religion and morality is not so clear; the power of religious
belief to influence behavior is a question that "remains largely
unanswered" (Parker, 1971).
The general impression drawn from the scientific reviews (Dittes,
1969; Graham, 1972; Parker, 1971; Strommen, 1971; Wright, 1971) is that
the question ultimately becomes which aspect of which type of religion
is related to which particular moral teaching or behavior?
analysis was beyond the scope of this study.

Such an

However, a religiosi ~

variable was included for several reasons: First, the relationship between
religion and guilt continues to be discussed (e.g., McConahay & Hough,
1973).

Second, when religiosity is measured only by a few beliefs or

church attendance, the results are quite limited.

However, Graham (1972)

concluded that the overall evidence suggests some relationship; he
theorized that religion which measures firm convictions and real commitment

may well be associated with avoidance of wrongdoing and sympathetic
consideration for others.

Third, two recent studies provide some support

for this idea, indicating that religious affiliation and, especially,
active involvement are associated with greater guilt proneness regarding
sex and with less premarital sexual behavior among both male and female
subjects (Langston, 1973; ZUckerman, Tushup, & Finner, 1976).

Earlier

investigations found similco..r results (Parker, 1971; Walters & Bradley,
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1971).

In addition, more religious subjects tended to turn their

aggression inward, thus engaging in less hostile behavior (Bateman &
Jensen, 1958).
Finally, Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) developed a religiosity
measure that includes not only beliefs and practices, but also personal
experience and everyday influence.

They tested the hypothesis that

religiosity functions as a "personal control against deviant behavior. n
They .found a network of predicted, meaningful relationships among 23
variables to support their hypothesis with the results being stronger
for high school seniors than for college juniors.
In regard to anxiety, Di. ttes (1969) in a review article noted a

general assumption that religion--especially when operationally defined
in terms of institutional affiliation or adherence to conservative
doctrines--is associated "torith personality deficiencies, including ''more
desperate defenses."

On the other hand, a salutary religious experience

could, if necessary, allay anxiety and provide reassurance at least for
those who are primarily committed to religion itself, as distinct from
the religious institution.

M:>re to the point, several factor analytic

studies indicated that religion, whether found to be unidimensional
(Brown, 1966) or multidimensional (Cline & Richards, 1965), is independent
of authoritarianism and neuroticism.

Furthermore, Rohrl:augh and Jessor

(1975) found the religious person to be quite conventional, conforming,
eschewing self-assertion, not lacking in self-esteem, not prone to a
particular locus of control orientation, and clearly not maladapted.
In the present study it was hypothesized that guilt and anxiety

are related to religiosity in different ways: religiosity is positively
related to total guilt, hostility guilt, and sex guilt; religiosity is
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independent of

anxie~.

Hypotheses
The primary purpose of this review of the literature was to
propose that gUilt and anxiety can be adequately differentiated and that
they differ in relation to differentiation, locus of control, empathy,
and religiosity.

At the same time individuals more prone to guilt are

regarded as differing from those leas prone to gull t in identifiable
wqs.

Several hypotheses were proposed, some of them in regard to total

guilt to facilitate comparisons w.i. th other research.

In some cases the

literature indicated the importance of sex differences.

Despite the

theoretical value of studying specific kinds of guilt, there is
relatively little research, presumably due to the lack of adequate
measures.

As a result, the present study included a fair amount of

exploratory research to determine and to compare the personality correlates
of the specific kinds of guilt for male and female subjects.
The following lzypotheses were tested:
1.

Guilt proneness and anxiety proneness are adequately
differentiated, being either statistically independent
or only slightly related.

2.

Anxie~

and sex guilt are positive]Jr related among

female but not among male subjects.

3. Field independence is poai tively related to guil.t,
but independent of, or negatively related to, anxiety.

4. Internal locus of control is poai ti. vely related

to

guilt among male subjects, but negative]Jr related to
anxiety among inal.e and female subjects.
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5.

Field-independent internals are more prone to guilt
and less prone to anxiety than the other differentiation/
locus of control t.ypes.

6. Empathy is positively related to total guilt

and to

hostility guilt, but negatively related to anxiety.

7. Religiosity is positively related to total guilt, sex
guilt and hostility guilt, but independent of anxiety.

CHAPTER III
MErHOD

SUbjects
The subjects were

5o

male and 47 female students attending a

variety of summer courses at Ioyola University of Chicago.
undergraduates.

Most were

All were volunteers; some received special credit in

class.
Sample characteristics: The age range tor male subjects was 18

to 47 years with a mean age of 22.54 and a standard deviation of 4.88;
only two subjects were over 28.

The age range for female subjects was

18 to 46 with a mean age of 22.72 years and a standard deviation of 6~~1;.
only four subjects were over 28.
Religious af'filia tion: Among the male subjects there were 30
Roman Catholics,

4 Protestants, 9

"other, 11 and 7 none.

subjects there were 22 Roman Catholics,

5

Among the i'ema.le

5 Protestants, 15

"other, n and

none.
Race: Among the male subjects there were 45 Caucasians, no

Negroes, 2 Orientals, and 3 "other. 11 .Anx>ng the female subjects there
were 41 Caucasians, 3 Negroes, 1 Oriental, and 2 11other. 11
Parochial education: Among the male subjects 31 had elementary
or high school or both,

4 had

somewhat less, and

15

had none.

.Among

female subjects 25 had elementary or high school or both, 3 had somewhat
less, and 19 had none.
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Measures
Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (Mosher, 1966, 1968): Three
separate scales were developed to measure a personality disposition
towards guilt in the areas of sex, hostility, and morality-conscience.
Separate forms for male and female subjects have 79 and 78 items,
respectively.

Choices are scaled -2, -1, +1, and +2, with higher scores

indicating greater guilt proneness.

Items differentiated high- and low-

guilt groups; choices were relatively well-matched on social desirability.
lbsher reported a multi trait-multimethod analysis of the meas'm."es
which provided some evidence of discriminant and convergent validity,
and indicated split-half reliabilities on the subscales between .92 and
• 97 for male and between .76 and • 95 for female subjects.

Test-retest

stability over a 3-week period was .87 for the total guilt score (Amd~
& Harrow, 1972).

M>sher found the scales to be independent of social.

desirability; however, sex guilt was later found to correlate ·37 with
social desirability (Galbraith, Hahn, & Lei berman, 1968) •

Schwartz

(1973) found the total guilt score independent of neuroticism and
extraversion on the Maudsley Personality Inventory.
Validity information about the individual
subscales: Sex guilt
,
was positively correlated with Sexuality, negatively with Sex Drive and
Interest and with Promiscuity on the Thorne Sex Inventory (Galbraith,
1969) and negatively with Heterosexuality on the Edwards Personal
Preference Schedule.

Construct validity has been substantiated in several

studies: High-guilt males inhibited expression of socially taooo words
whether disapproval was likely or not, whereas low-guilt males did so only
when disapproval, i.e., potential censure, was likely (M>sher, 1965).
High-guilt females experienced greater state guilt after exposure to

explicitly sexual literature (Mosher & Greenberg, 1969) or to sexual
stimulus words (Janda & Magri, 1975).

High-guilt males or females had

less permissive standards aoout premarital sex, engaged in less intimate
sexual behavior (Langston, 1973; Mosher & Cross, 1971), and masturbated
less often (Abramson & Mosher, 1975) • Male sex guilt was the strongest
predictor (e.g., stronger than stage of ooral reasoning) of the extent
of an unmarried couple's sex experiences (D'Augelli & Cross, 1975)~
Hostility guilt was negatively correlated with hostility on a
projective measure (Schill & Schneider, 1970b) and on the Buss-Durkee
Hostility Inventory (Schill & Schneider, 1970a), was not related to selfesteem, dogmatism, or social class, and was positively related to anxiety
(Knott et al., 1974).

Construct validity has received support in several

studies: Low-guilt males expressed more aggressive responses during baseline measurement, were more responsive to reinforcement for aggression,
and less responsive to reinforcement for nonaggression, whereas high-guilt
subjects did not respond to reinforcement for aggression (Knott et al. ,
1974).

High-gullt subjects expressed less verbal hostility in a verbal

conditioning paradigm (Mosher, 1965).

High-guilt inmates committed less

crimes against people and more against property Ot>sher & Mosher, 1966),
and committed less crimes overall (Persons, 1970) •

High-gullt females

showed less aggression after being experimentally frustrated (Schill,
1972b).
/

High-guilt males expressed greater state guilt after verbal

aggression against a victim (Okel & Mosher, 1968).
Morality-conscience guilt ha.s been investigated in very few
studies.

!Dw-guilt males and females had a less critical attitude toward

the use of various drugs, used a greater variety of drugs, and expressed

.....
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a greater likelihood of continuing to do so (Schill & Althoff, 197.5).
Morality-conscience and hostility guilt, in combination, correlated •.5.5
with stage of moral reasoning for delinquents (Ruma & M:>sher, 1967).
Apparently oniy the first three stages were well represented.

It was

positively correlated with a measure of superego on the Lazare-KJ.erman
Scale (Amdur & Harrow, 1972) •
A copy of the Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory for men and
the scoring key are included in the Appendix.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al.,
1970): STAI A-Trai. t scale consists of 20 statements that ask individuals
to describe on a 4-point scale how they generally feel.

Scores range

from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater proneness to anxiety.
The STAI Manual includes normative and psychometric data for the STAI
A-Trait Scale.

Reliability information: Internal consistency is high

with coefficient alphas ranging from .86 to .92 and test-retest coefficients ranging from • 73 to .86.

Validit'J information: It correlated

from .73 to .8o with the Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Institute for
Personality and Ability Testing Arociety Scale.

Construct validity was

supported by several studies showing predictable increases in state
anxiety under varying conditions.

Further, trait anxiety was not related

to the various subtests of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule,

except for abasement; correlated positively 'With the numl:er of problems
checked in each area on the Hooney Problem Checklist; correlated
positive:cy with the appropriate l1MPI scales; and was not related to sex,
intelligence, scholastic aptitude, or achievement among college students.
Group Embedded Figures Test (01 tman, Raskin, & Witkin, 1971):
It consists of 18 complex figures, 17 of which were taken from the

!fTT7!SO'

-

=
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individually administered Embedded Figures Test.

The Manual (Witkin et

al., 1971) reported split-half reliability estimates of .82 for male and
female subjects.

Validity coefficients for male and female subjects,

respectively, were as follows: -.82 and -.63 1-ti.th the individual Embedded
Figures Test, -.39 and

-.34

with the Rod and Frame Test (coefficients

are negative for the Embedded Figures Test and Rod and Frame Test because
of reverse scoring), • 71 and

.55

with degree of oody articulation.

On the

Group Embedded Figures Test higher scorers were more field independent.
Males scored slightly higher than females.

Another study showed a

reliabi.li ty coefficient of • 84 between the first and second h.alf for male
subjects, and a correlation ~>lith the Rod and Frame Test of -.69 (Dumsha,
Minard, & McWilliaJIJS, 1973).

The Group :Binbedded Figures Test is con-

sidered a satisfactory substitute for the Embedded Figures Test in
research requiring group testing.
Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control scale (I-E) (Rotter,

1966): The scale consists of 29 forced-choice items, including six buffer
items.

Higher scores are more external.

Major review articles by Rotter

(1966), Lefcourt (1966, 1972), Throop and Mc!bnald (1971) and Joe (1971)
have summarized the extensive research on locus of control which indicates
satisfactory reliabili tv and validity.

Sex differences have sometimes

been fo1.md.
One major critic ism of the I·· E scale is its mul tifactor structure.
Mirels (1970) found two factors, replicated for the most part by other
authors (Strahan & Huth, 1975).

The first factor, which is similar for

male and female subjects, includes the follo\ti.ng items from the I-E
scale:

5, 10,

11, 15, 16, 18, 23, 25, 28.

\

A copy of these items is
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included in the Appendix.

Both the I-E scale and the J.firels-like

components were found to be statistically independent of field independence on the Group :Embedded Figures Test (Strahan & Ruth, 1975).
Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan,

1969): The scale consists of 64 items,

mostly from the California Psychological Inventory and the MMPI, which
discriminated groups independently rated as high and low on empathy.
copy of the scale is included in the Appendix.
greater empathy.

A

Higher scores indicate

Hogan (1969, 1973) reported psychometric and inter-

pretative inf'orma.tion.

Test-retest stability over two months was .84.

Estimated internal consistency was • 71.

Validity information: It

correlated .58 with social acuity, discriminated students rated high a."ld.
low on social acuity by their teachers, predicted Q-sort empathy ratings

with correlations ranging from .39 to .62, was positively related to
social competence and to a factor measuring social and interpersonal
adequacy on the California Psychological Inventory, and was not related
to a measure of socialization.

It predictably differentiated delinquents

from nondelinquents, when both were low on socialization (Kurtines &
Hogan, 1972), and, also, heroin addicts from collegiate marijuana users
(Kurtines, Hogan, & Weiss, 1975).
With maturity of moral judgment.

It\predictably correlated .48 and .58
It correlated negatively with

authoritarianism and positively with ego strength.
intelligence was somewhat ambiguous.

The relationship with

Female subjects scored higher than

male.
Measure of Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975): The scale
consists. of four pairs of items to operationalize Glock's four dimensions
of religiosity, i.e., ritual, consequential, ideological, and experiential.
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Institutional affiliation or reference to doctrines of any specific
religion are avoided, as is an agreement response set.
on a 5-point scale from 0 to

4,

Items are scored

yielding a composite score of 0 to 32

'With high scores indicating greater religiosity.

Response variance is

broad 'With a standard deviation of approximately 8.

A copy of this

measure is included in the .Appendix.
Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) showed that the psychometric
properties of the subscales and composite were satisfactory.
consistency was high With a coefficient alpha of .90.

Internal

Validit"'J

information: A number of indications converge to provide some overall
evidence of validity.

First, it confirmed accepted data about religiosity,

e.g., that high school students are more religious than college students

-~-

\

and that female subjects are higher than male subjects (though not for the

college sample).

Second, multiple correlation of the subscales with a

self-rating of religious commi ilnent was very high for all four samples.
Third, the unidimensional score was supported
of the subscales.

qy the high intercorrelations

Fourth, the subscales correlated more among themselves

than they did with two other measures of the religious environment.
Finally, the study, itself, provided some support for its construct
validity as a personal control.

It was not related to sex or socioeconomic

background among the college sample.
For the present study, the first item concerning frequency of
attendance at religious services was modified slightly to facilitate
scoring.

It read:

""

How often have you attended religious services during the past
year? a) Never.

b) A few times.

c) About once a month.

d) A few times

30
a month.. e) Weekly.
Administration
The Group Embedded Figures Test was administered in small groups,
in some cases during class time.

The other measures were handed out to

the students and returned a few days later.

Sixteen individuals did not

finish the testing or their protocols were unusable.

}bst subjects

remained aDOl\YJDOUS; the others were guaranteed confidentiality.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

The results were analyzed separately for male and female
subjects.

For the exploratory parts of this research two-tailed tests

of significance were appropriate and their use is noted; otherwise, onetailed tests were used.

Simple and multiple correlations are described,

as well as certain interaction effects.

A stepwise multiple-regression

anal.ysis was performed with field independence, locus of control, empathy,
religiosity, and age as predictor variables, and with anxiety and the four
guilt measures as dependent variables.

In this procedure the predictor.=

variables were entered in successive steps according to which of them
accounted for the largest amount of remaining variance in the dependent
variable.

In the following description the percentage of increase in R2

accounted for by each predictor is noted in parenthesis.
The means and standard deviations or all variables for roth sexes
are presented in Table 1.

No significant differences were found with t

·tests between male and female subjects on field independence, locus of
control, empathy, religiosity, anxiety, or age.

Pearson correlations

'-

between all personality variables are presented in Table 2 with a
summary of the oore relevant significant correlations in Table 3.
Anxiety
AB lzypothesized, anxiety was found among male subjects to be

statistically independent of the four guilt measures.
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Also, as
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Table 1
List of Variables with Means and Standard Deviations
for Male and Female SUbjects

11a.le

Female

(! = 5o)

(!!

= 47)

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Meari

Standard
Deviation

11.62

4.54

l0.64a

4-39

8.50

3·87

9.68a

4.12

Empathy

38.90

5.99

40.32a

5.90

Religiosity

15.78

9.10

16.6oa

7-99

Anxiety

36.56

6.8o

36.7ha

8.26

Total Guilt

-7-38b

48.69

-57 .o6

37.20

-16.22°

20.02

-40.96

23.51

Hostility Guilt

5.o8d

18.84

-4.23

13.85

MOrality-Conscience

3.76e

17.76

-11.87

10.23

Variable
Field Independence
!Deus of Control

Sex Guilt

Age

22.54

4.88

22.72a

6.51

aNote: The difference between the male and female means was not
significant.
bActual range for males -84 to +98; for females -104 to +77
c
II
fl
II
II
If
-59 to +56
-43 to +37; II
d II
II
II
II
-27 to +25
" -32 to +39; 11
e
If
11
" -24 to +12
" " -29 to +32; II

c•;!'~

Table 2
Correlation Matrix for All Personality Variables for Both Sexesa

Variable

1

-o4b

1. Field Ind
2. Locus

2

-o4d

3
23c
-1)+

4

6

7

8

9

10

-31

-04

-22

-32

-11

-13

-10

-27

17

-38

-29

-37

-32

-50

04

-34

-24

-30

-20

-11

13

-10

65

61

39

69

09

-11

-15

-15

01

-22

82e

84e

14

64

70

1'-~

48

23

14

-24

4. Religiosity

-l~o

-09

-32

5. Anxiety

-09

22

-20

08

6. Total Glti..lt

13

22

-29

28

25

1· Sex Guilt

01

17

-37

39

24

89e

8. Hostility

24

oh

02

-07

02

6oe

24

9. Mlrali ty-Con

14

35

-22

23

33

77e

62

28

-o8

02

-22

20

-03

08

19

-23

3· Empathy

10. Age

9le

-01
16

(li = 50) in upper right, females (! = 47) in lower left.
:All decimals have been omitted.
cFor males ~ < .01, one-tailed test requires ~ = .34; two-tailed, ~ = .36;
11
n
.o5, . "
,,
"
11
.24;
"
"
.28;
dFor females 1?. < .01, one-tailed test requires ~ = .34; two-tailed, :: = .37;
11
It
.05,
II
II
fl
II
.24;
II
II
o29o
eThese are spuriously high, part-to-whole correlations.
It

~Males

Table 3
Summary

of Significant Correlations Pertaining to Hypotheses

Guilt
Anxiety

Total

Hostility

Sex

Morality-Con.

Field Independence

-.32*

Male
Female

.24*

Locus of Control
Male

-.38**

-.29*

-·37**

Female

-.32*
.35*

:Empathy
Male
Female

-.30*

-.34**
-.29*

-·37**

Religiosity
Male
Female
'*£

< .o

**E.< .01

***E.< .001

.65***

.61***

.. 2~

·39**

·39**

.69***

\.r.,)

a

J::""'

hypothesized, anxiety was negatively related to empathy (!:_

i!.

< .01),

= -.34,

and independent of field independence and religiosity.

The

h3Pothesized negative relationship between anxiety and internal locus
of control was not supported; no relationship was found between them
on Rotter's scale or on Mirels' Factor I.
analysis is swrma.ri.zed in Table

The multiple-regression

4. Empathy (11%), understandably, was

the best predictor, followed tu age (3%).

Together they yielded a

multiple R of .38, which explained approxima.tely 1>% of the variance.
Th~other

\j

variables contributed negligibly.

For female subjects the results were slightly different.

The

h3Pothesized relationships between anxiety and guilt were supported.
Anxiety was related in a low positive way to sex guilt (!:
and to mrali ty-conscience gull t (!:_ = • .33, E.
of total guilt and hostility guilt.

< .05),

but was independent:::

The hypothesized absence of a
be+-~_:.... .,.

relationship between anxiety and .field independence and
and religi.osi ty was confirmed.

= .24, E. < .o>)

...-- ~-:.,

v;J

However, the hypothesized negative

relationships With empatby and internal locus of control were not
supported; no relationships were .found.

In the case of female anxiety,

the overall multiple-regression analysis was not significant.
Total Guilt
Total guilt, as eypothesized, among male subjects was negatively
related to locus of control on Rotter's scale (!:_
positively related to religiosity (!:,

= -.38, E.<

= .65, E.< .001).

.01) and

Thus, male subjects

higher on total guilt were more internal and more religious.

Jtypothesized

positive relationships with field independence and empathy were not
supported.

The regression analysis, summarized in Table

5,

indicated that

Table

4

Multip1e-Regression SUmmary for Male Anxiety

Variable

R

R2

2
R change

Simple !:.

Bopatby

.34

.11

.11

-.34

Age

.)8

.15a

.03

-.22

Religiosity

·39

.15

.oo

-.09

Locus of Control

-39

.15

.oo

.16

~2 varies slightly from the figures in the "!!:.2 change 11
column due to rounding errors.
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Table 5
MUltiple-Regression Summary for Total Guilt

R

-R2

!!.2 change

Simple r_

Religiosity

.65

.42

.42

.65

Empathy

.71

.5oa

.07

-.24

!Deus of Control

-75

.56

.o6

-.38

Field Independence

.75

.56

.oo

-.22

EDpathy

.29

.08

.oa

-.29

Religiosity

.35

.12

.04

.28

Field Independence

.44

.20a

.07

·13

!Deus of Control

.49

.24

.o5

.22

Male

Female

~2 varies slightly from the figures in the
column due to rounding errors.

11

2 change"

R

-

38
religiosity (42%) was the best predictor, followed b.r empathy (7%), and
locus of control

(6%).

The multiple ~was

.75,

accounting for

56%

of

the variance.

Among female subjects total guilt was positively related to
religiosity (!:,

to empathy (!:,
hypothesis.

=

.28, E.<

.o5),

= -.29, E.< .o5,

as hypothesized, but negatively related
two-tailed test), contrary to the

The lzypothesized positive relationship with field indepenTotal guilt was not related to locus of control.

dence was not supported.

5,

The regression analysis, swnmarized in Table

indicated that empathy

(8%) was the best predictor, followed by religiosity (4%), field
independence (7%), and locus of control
explaining

(5%).

The multiple R was

.49,

24% of the variance.

Sex Guilt
Sex guilt, as hypothesized, among male subjects was negatively.
related to locus of control on Rotter's scale (!:,
positively related to religiosity (!:,

= .61, E.<

= -.29, E.< .o5)

Contrary to the

.001).

hypothesis, it was negatively related to field independence (!:,

E.< .o5, two-tailed test) and to empathy (!:,
test).

= -.30,

and

1?.. <

.o5,

= -.32,

two-tailed

Thus, male subjects higher on sex guilt were more field indepen-

dent, more internal, less empathic, and more religious.

In the regression

analysis, summarized in Table 6, religiosity (37%) was the best predictor, '
followed by empathy
yielded a multiple

(11%)

!! of

and locus of control (3%).

• 71, accounting for

51%

Together these

of the variance.

Among female subjects sex guilt was positively related to

religiosity (!:,
empathy (!:,

= .39,

1?.. < .01) as hypothesized, and negatively related to

= -.37, E.<

.01, two-tailed test) contrary to the hypothesis.

..,
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Table 6
MUltiple-Regression Summary for Sex Guilt

R

R2

~2 change

Religiosity

.61

-37

-37

.61

Empathy

.69

.48

.ll

-.30

Locus of Control

.71

.51

.03

-.29

Field Independence

.72

.52

.o1

-.32

Age

.72

.52

.oo

.14

Religiosity

-39

.15

.15

·39

Thlpathy

.47

.22

.07

--37

Field Independence

.5o

.25

.03

.01

.53

.28

.03

.17

.53

.28

.oo

.19

Simple !:

Male

Female

Locus
Age

or

Control

---._..
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The hypothesized positive relationship with field independence was not
supported.

No specific hypotheses were tested regarding locus of control

In the regression analysis,

and no significant relationships were found.
s~~rized

in Table

independence

6, religiosity (15%), empathy (7%), and field

(3%) yielded a multiple

~

of

.So,

explaining

25% of the

variance.
Hostility Guilt
Hostility guilt among male subjects, as hypothesized, was
negatively related to locus of control on Rotter's scale

(~

= -.37

E.< .01) and positively related to religiosity (! = .39, E. ( .01).
Thus, male subjects higher on hostility guilt were more internal and
more religious.

The hypothesized positive relationships with field

independence and empathy were not supported.
summarized in Table

;~

..

In the regression analysis,

7, religiosity (15%), locus of control (8%), and

empathy (7%) yielded a multiple R of .54, explaining 29% of the total
variance.
Among female subjects hostility guilt was positively related to
field independence (~

= .24, E. < .o5). This was the only instance in the

study in which the hypothesized relationship between guilt and field
independence lias confirmed.

The hypothesized positive relationships with

empathy and religiosity were not supported.

Again, there was no hypothesis

regarding locus of control and no relationship was found.

In the

regression analysis the other variables contributed only negligibly.
Morality-Conscience Guilt
MOrality-conscience guilt among male subjects, as hypothesized,
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Table 7
11ultiple-Regression Summary for Male Hostility Guilt

R

R2

R2 change

Religiosity

.)9

.15

.15

.)9

Locus of Control

.48

.2)

.08

--37

&upatby

.54

.29a

.07

-.20

Age

.55

.)0

.01

.22

Field Independence

.55

.)0

.oo

-.11

Variable

Si.mple

~2 varies slightly from the figures in the 11R2 change"
column due to rounding errors.

!:_

":~
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was negatively related to locus of con+~ol on Rotter's scale (~

1?. < .05) and positively related to religiosity

(~

= .69, E.<

= -.32,

.001); thus,

male subjects higher on guilt were, as in previous cases, more internal.
and more religious.

In the regression analysis, summarized in Table 8,

religiosity explained 48% of the variance with the other variables
contributing only negligibly.
Among female subjects the hypothesized positive relationship with
field independence was not supported.
explored; only the

tenden<~~

Other possible relationships were

for high-guilt subjects to be more external

reached significance (on Rotter's scale ~ = • 35 and on Hirels 1 Factor I
~

= .30;

for each E.<

.o5,

two-tailed tests).

The regression analysis,

summarized in Table 8, indicated that external control (12%), religios¥:?1

(7%), and field independence (8%) yielded a multiple R of

.53,

which

explained 28% of the variance.
Interaction Effects
Possible interaction effects l::etween field independence and locus
of control, and between field independence and empathy, were tested by
two-way analysis of variance with three levels of each independent
variable, and with anxiety and the four guilt measures as dependent
variables.

This was done for ooth sexes.

As in previous research field

independence and locus of control were not related for either sex.

Nor

were field independence and empathy significantly related, although there
was a tendency for field-independent males to be more empathic.

Twent,y

separate analyses yielded only one significant interaction, namely, that
between field independence and locus of control on Rotter's scale on
morality-conscience guilt among female subjects, F

(4,

38)

= 3.46,

E.< .02.
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Table 8
Multiple-Regression Summary for MOrality-Conscience Guilt

R

R2

Religiosity

.69

.48

.48

.69

Empatey

.70

.5o

.02

-.11

Locus of Control

.12

.52

.02

-.32

Age

.73

.54

.02

.oo

Field Independence

.74

.55

.01

-.13

-g_2 change

Simple !:.

Male

-·-~.

Female
.12

.12

.35

Religiosity

.35
.44

.19

.07

.24

Field Independence

.53

.28a

.08

.14

Age

.54

.29a

.01

.16

Empathy

.54

.2r

.oo

-.22

Iocus of Control

~2 varies slightly from the figures in the
column due to rounding errors.

11

R2 change"

The means and standard deviations are shown in Table 9, with the results
of the analysis of variance in Table 10.

Field-independent internals

were hypothesized to be higher on guilt and lower on anxiety; however,
these hypotheses were not confirmed.

The field-independent external

female group was higher on guilt than the other types.

Ten additional

analyses of variance with two levels of Mirels' Factor I yielded no
significant interactions.

Table 9
Means and Standard Devia tiona for Field Independence by
IJ:>cus of Control Analysis of Variance on Female
MOrality-Conscience Guilt

N

Mean

Internals

6

-11.67

11.81

Mi.d

5

-16.80

3-27

Externals

4

7.75

4.03

Field-Ind:

Standard Deviation

High

Locus of Control

<~

Field-Ind:

Medium

IJ:>cus of Control
Internals

3

-20.00

h.oo

1-lid

6

-14.33

8.69

Externals

1

-15.57

10.98

Internals

5

-15.60

4-72

Mid

6

-10.33

10.33

Externals

5

-8.00

5.38

Fl.eld-Ind:

IJ:>w

Locus of Control
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Table 10
Field Independence by Locus of Control Analysis of Variance on
Female Morality-Conscience Gull t

Source of Variation

elf

Mean square

F

Field Independence

2

340.19

4.8~

.01

Locus of Control

2

3~4.68

~.07

.01

Interaction

4

242.13

3.46

.02

38

70.01

Residual

··-~

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION
Anxiety proneness and guilt proneness, as hypothesized, were
adequately differentiated f'rom each other.

.Ainong male subjects the four

guilt measures were independent of anxiety.

Among female subjects there

was a slight positive relationship between anxiety and seJr guilt, as
hypothesized, and between arud.ety and morality-conscience guilt.

The

absence of a significant correlation among male subjects and the low
correlation among female subjects supported the interpretation that
guilt and anxiety are best regarded as separate constructs among normal
subjects of' either sex.
The present results provided clearer evidence than previous
research that anxiety and guilt are not related among male subjects.
Secondly, since guilt is independent of, or only minimally related to,
anxiety, there is no support for the opinion that guilt is necessarily
somewhat pathological.

There may be some elements of fear in a guilt

response, but that is not to say that guilt is best understood. in terms
of a more basic fearfulness within those individuals who are relatively
more guilt prone.

At the very least, people appear to be more selective

and more specific about their fears.

Research into the object or such

fears (e.g., authorities, God, traditional rules of institutions, loss
of self-esteem) could be valuable.

M:>re to the point, the results

provided no argumeny against considering guilt as a possibly constructive
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h8
aspect of personality development.
Field Independence
The further attempt to relate guilt and anxiety to theoretically
meaningful variables was only partially successful.
~othesized

First of all, it was

that field independence was positively related to guilt but

independent of, or negatively related to, an.."dety.

The latter part of

the hypothesis was confirmed l:u' the absence of a relationship between
field independence and anxiety for both sexes.

The relationship between

field independence and guilt was more corrq:>licated, varying with sex and
the specific kind of guilt.

For example, field-independent female subjects

were higher on hostility guilt whereas field-independent male subjects
were lower on sex guilt.

The first example confinned the initial part of

the hypothesis while the second example was in the opposite direction.

In

fact, the first example represented the only case in which the hypothesis
was confirmed.
Overall, field independence was independent of anxiety and six of
the eight guilt measures.

It, therefore, provided little in the way of a

theoretical and developmental framework for understanding guilt and anxiety
among normal subjects.

There was no support for vlitkin et a1 's. (1962)

earlier suggestion that field-dependent individuals are more prone to
anxiety.

The present results, along with previous research (Iergel &

Kirk, 1973; Joshi, 1974), provided solid evidence that differentiation
and anxiety proneness are not related.

Second, the results suggest that

field-independent female subjects,who are conceptualized as having a more
developed sense of identity and a greater tendency to label feeli:ngs
precisely, used more constructive and socially acceptable ways of dealing
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with their frustration, anger, and hostility.

This type of theorizing,

however, is of limited value since it is not clear why such reasons do
not apply to other kinds of
insight regarding sex guilt.

guilt~

Third, the results may provide some

Under the

new morality" sexual ethics

11

have undergone much examination and change.

Inasmuch as Mosher's scale

reflects socioconventional moral understanding, it is possible that fieldindependent males adopt a less conventional moral position.

The question

for further research is whether they still have certain norms and would
feel gullty for violating them, although their norms in a time of ethical
transition would be less likely to reflect the older norms of the wider
society.
Perhaps the conventional and uncomplicated nature of Mosher's
scale nti..z_Wnizes the relevance of atV distinction based on field independence and/or relatively greater complexity within the psychological
system.

In other words, field-dependent subjects are so tuned in to their

social environment, its norms and expectations, that they have absorbed
conventional morality, experience real guilt in that regard, and,
therefore,~do not differ from field-independent subjects.

This would also

explain why field-dependent subjects in the Witkin et al. (1968} study
experienced some guilt while still being more prone to shame (as opposed

to field-independent subjects who experienced more guilt than shame) •
'Whether field-independent subjects would be more reflective, more
principled, more internalized, and, therefore, more guilt prone than
field-dependent subjects on moral issues that are not part of the package
of conventional moral wisdom is a question for future research.
The minimal influence of field independence may reflect a

So
methodological problem.

Some authors pointed out that a more rigorous

testing of differentiation theory involves the use of two acceptable
measures, in 'Which case the shared variance is then correlated with
another variable.

The present results are limited, of course, by the use

of a single measure, the Group Embedded Figures Test.
Locus of Control
The second theoretical variable, thought to explain some of the
variance in anxtety and guilt, was locus of control.
hypothe~ized

measures.

Male internals were

to be higher on guilt; this was confirmed for all the guilt

Internals of both sexes were hypothesized to be lower on

anxiety than externals; this was not confirmed but the trend was in
predicted direction.

th~::,::

Although there were no hypotheses for female subjects

on guilt, externals were found to be higher than internals on moralityconscience guilt.

The different pattern of correlations and the contrast

between male and female subjects on morality-conscience guilt, i.e.,
moderate relationships in opposite directions, show the importance of the
sex variable and specific kinds of gull t.

Also, locus of control provided

some theoretical background for differentiating anxiety and guilt, at
least for male subjects.
The research reviewed earlier indicated that internals made a
stronger attribution of responsibility, engaged in more self-criticism,
were higher on resistance and remorse, and emphasized internal sanctions.
Second, other research indicated that high-guilt subjects responded to
personal cues rather than to surveillance or punislunent.

In line with this

description, the present results supported the interpretation tbat male
internals manifest a personal, internalized sense of conventional moral

responsibility.

Furthermore, the present study indicates that this is

well-founded not onlY for global measures of guilt, as employed by
Johnson et al. (1968) and Adams-Webter (1969), but for specific kinds of
guilt as well.
confirmed here.

The sex differences found by Johnson et al. were also
It seems likely that the absence of sex differences in

Adams-Webber's study may be due to the restricted measure e:rrq:>loyed,
namely two

projecti~e

stories.

A general impression from the present

study is that guilt is too complicated to be studied with such a limited
measure.
found

The failure to control for sex may explain why Schwartz (1973)

ex~rnals

higher on total guilt with a sample that included male

and female subjects.

These results may be attributable to the female

externals who in the present study were higher on morali ty-conscierige
guilt, with a similar but not significant trend on total guilt and sex
guilt.

At the same time, the theoretical implications of female subjects'

scoring higher on guilt remain unclear.

In SlUl'llDa.I"Y, the concept of internal locus of control provides
some explanation for male guilt.

Second, because the results were not

similar for both sexes, different theoretical variables may be required
to explain male and female guilt.

Third, because the results were not

similar for the specific kinds of guilt, different theoretical constructs
may also be required to explain different kinds of guilt.
The results noted above were based on Rotter's locus of control
measure.

In a further attempt to clarify the influence of locus of

control and to overcome any masking of effects due to the multifactor
structure of Rotter's scale, the

influenc~

of Mi.rels 1 first factor, which

refers to a feeling of mastery over the course of one's life, was also

noted.

For female subjects the pattern of' relationships was the same on

both meas,ures.

For male subjects the pattern of' correlations was different,

with male internals being higher only on hostility guilt and not, as before,
on all the guilt measures.

Hence, with M:i..rels' measure the influence of'

locus of' control is minimal.
Various combinations of' field independence and locus of' control
were analyzed, on the ass'lmlption that certain typologies are more congruent,
that is, more psychologically consistent than others.

Field-independent

internals were hypothesized to be higher on guilt and lo't-ler on anxiety than
the other types.

Neither hypothesis was supported.

The only significant

interaction on the 3 x 3 analysis of' variance indicated that fieldindependent external (i.e., an incongruent type) female subjects were ·::-::
higher on morality-conscience guilt.
Mi.rels' scal.e.

No interaction was significant with

No theoretical explanation for this single significant

result is apparent.

Inasmuch as 30 interactions were analyzed, it may

have been due to chance.

Perhaps all that can be noted is that the recent,

embryonic theorizing aoout consistent and inconsistent typologies has not
led, thus far, to meaningful results about guilt and anxiety.

A third theoretical variable, empathy, was considered.
was hypothesized to be negatively related to anxiety.

Bmpathy

This was confirmed

for male subjects and the results were in the predicted direction but
were not significant for female subjects.

Second, it 'tfas predicted that

empathy was positively related to total guilt and to hostility guilt.
This was not confirmed.

Actually, empathy was found to be negatively

related to sex guilt for males, and negatively related to total guilt and

sex guilt for females.
Empathy, then, contributed very little to the predicted
theoretical structure explaining the difference between
guilt.

an_~et,r

and

The results about anxiety are similar to Hogan 1 s (1969) research,

using the l-lanifest Anxiety Scale, and support the general illlpression that
enpathy and adjustment are positively related.

The results about guilt

are surprising, even though restricted, for the most part, to sex guilt
since it is the correlation wi. th sex guilt that substantially contributes
to the significant correlation with total guilt.

In retrospect, the

socioconventional character of Mosher's scale may provide some clarification.

SUch a conventional scale implies the kind of rigid rules and

controls characteristic of Kohl berg's stages of conventional moral
reasoning.

:~

At the same time, there is a positive relationship between

empathy and moral reasoning (Hogan & Dickstein, 1972).

One can speculate,

therefore, that more eJ!i>athic individuals, i.e., those more sensitive to
the effects of their behavior on others, sense an inadequacy in a morality
of rules aoout sexual behavior and have moved beyond this 1110ral position.
(Whether they tend to adopt a morality that says "it 1s all right providing
nobody is being hurt 11 is another question.)

The tendency of subjects high

on sex guilt to judge moral dilemmas in terms of rigid codes and laws
provides some support for this interpretation (D 1Augelli

& Cross, 1975).

This interpretation is limited, however, in its failure to explain the
absence of a relationship between empathy and hostility guilt.
Religiosity
Religiosity, as hypothesized, was not related to anxiety for
either sex.

Also, as hypothesized, it was positively related to total
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gui.l t and sex guilt for both sexes, and to hostility guilt f'or male
subjects.

However, the hypothesized positive relationship with hosti.li ty

guilt among female subjects was not conf'irmed.
The absence of a relationship with anxiety supports the theory
that "religion"--when defined operationally in terms of' interest, activity
and experience, rather than mere af'filiation--is not related to personality deficiencies.

At the same time, religiosity was strongly related to

guilt, especially among male subjects.

There seem to be two explanations

for this phenomenon, possibly complementing each other.

First, the guilt

subscales for male subjects are highly intercorrelated, e.g., .64, .70,
and .48 (whereas the corresponding figures for the female subscales are
much lower, i.e., .24, .62, and .28); and this occurs despite the

lack~:f'

evidence in the literature :f'or the existence of a generalized conscience.
Hence, the similarity of the relationships, especially among the male
subjects, may reflect, in part, a methodological bias.

Second, an element

of social conventionality characterizes the more religious person on the
Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975) scale, as well as the more guilty person on the
1-bsher scale.

This underlying element of' social conventionaJ.ity may help

to explain the strong relationship between guilt and religiosity in the
present study.
A further difficulty in the present data, namely, the absence of
a relationship between religiosity and female hostility guilt, may be
attributable to cultural factors.

In some respects society tolerates a

greater show of aggression/hostility from men.

Since more religious male

subjects seem less prone to hostile behavior, it is possible that religious
belief's and experience may reduce male hostility.

On the other hand, women,
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independence and empathy.

Hence, their inclusion in the regression

analysis did not provide the anticipated clarification.

The nroltiple

correlations were more valuable regarding guilt than amd.ety.

When they

were large enough to be of theoretical value, religiosity was by far the
most substantial predictor for male subjects, while internal control and
low empathy were of lesser value.

Lastly, each female guilt variable was

best explained by a different predictor.

This indicates that either the

choice of predictors was poor, or that there is a high degree of
specificity in the theoretical understanding of different kinds of guilt.
The latter suggestion complements Allinsmith's (196o) suggestion that
internalizations in different moral areas do not necessarily have the
same developmental origins.
Limitations
There are several obvious limitations to the present study: First,
it was based upon self-reported, conscious attitudes in an admittedly
sensitive area.

Second, it has been suggested that college students, the

subjects in this study, may sometimes adopt a position of moral relativism
in order to .free themselves from the guilt induced during their adolescence
by family and by society (Kohlberg & Kramer,

5o%

of the subjects were Roman Catholic and

amount of parochial education.

1969)..

many

Third, appro:xi.mately

of them had a large

Finally, any comparisons between the sexes

were restricted by the use of different guilt measures for each sex.

Be-

cause of these limi.ta tiona further corro oora tion is needed with data less
subject to distortion (though still about specific kinds of guilt) and
with more representative older subjects who
mral reasoning.

may

be more settled in their
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Conclusions
This study proposed that guilt and anxiety could be adequately
differentiated from each other and in relation to field independence,
locus of control, empathy, and religiosity.
1.

Anxiety was adequately distinguished from total guilt and
from the specific kinds of guilt for both sexes.

2.

Field independence was not related to anxiety for either
sex, nor to guilt, with two exceptions: There was a
negative relationship with male sex guilt and a positive
one with female morality-conscience guilt.

Field

independence, as measured 1::w the Group Embedded Figures
Test, was of little value in clarifying the concepts of
anxiety and guilt.

3·

!Deus of control was not related to anxiety for either
sex.

Male internals were higher on all guilt variables;

female externals were higher on morality-conscience guilt.
!Deus of control, interpreted here as internalization of
responsi bill ty, was of particular value in understanding
male guilt.

4.

The notion of congruent versus incongruent field independence/locus of control types yielded no meaningful results.

S.

Empathy was negatively related to anxiety for males but
not for females; and negatively related to sex guilt for
both sexes.

This may indicate that more empathic

individuals tend to move beyond rigid, conventional rules
governing sexual behavior.
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6. Religiosity was independent of anxiety for roth sexes, but
strongly related to guilt, especially for males.

Overall,

it was the strongest predictor of guilt, perhaps due to
the socioconventional quality of the Mosher scales.

7.

sex differences were readily apparent.

The personality

correlates of guilt differed, at least when the guilt
criterion differed for each sex.

8. The personality correlates of specific kinds or guilt showed
considerable variety.
ravel this

c~mplex

Extensive research is needed to un-

phenomenon.

The generalizabili ty of these conclusions is limited b,y the use or
a single measure or differentiation, b,y the conscious, self-report

nat~!

or the guilt data, by the construct or guilt proneness {which is distinct
from actual resistance or actual remorse), and b,y the sample or primarily
R01nan Catholic college students.

This stuqy proposed that guilt proneness and anxiety proneness
are best considered as separate constructs, and that they differ in their
relationships with field independence, locus of control, empathy, and
religiosity.

Furthermore, it attempted to integrate the construct of

guilt proneness into a wider theoretical network for each sex.
Guilt proneness was conceptualized, with MOsher, as a disposition
within specific content areas to resist temptation or, after transgression,

to engage in self-criticism, remorse, confession or expiation; it was
operationally defined qy the MOsher Forced-Choice Guilt Scale (MOsher,
"

--:~

1966, 1968) which includes separate forms for man and women, and provides
a score for total guilt, as well as sex guilt, hostility guilt and
morality-conscience guilt.
The following measures were included: for anxiety proneness, the
trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, &
Lushene, 1971}; for field independence, the Group Embedded Figures Test
(Oltman, Raskin, & Witkin, 1971); for locus of control, the Rotter
Internal-External Scale; the Hogan Enpathy Scale (Hogan, 1969); and the
Measure of Religiosity (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975).
The subjects were

50

male and

47

female students--mostly under-

graduates--attending summer courses as a large, private midwestern
university.

Hypotheses were tested either by Pearson correlations or by

analysis of variance.
The results and conclusions were, as follows:
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1.

All guilt variables for both sexes 1>rere adequately differentia ted from anxiety.

2.

Field independence was not related to anxiety for either sex,
nor to guilt, with two exceptions: There was a negative relationship with male sex guilt and a positive one with female moralityconscience guilt.

Field independence proved to be of little

value in clarifying t?-nxiety and gu:il t.

3· !Deus of control was not related to anxiety for either sex.
Male internals were significantly higher than externals on all
guilt variables; female externals were higher than internals on
morality-conscience guilt.

Locus of control, interpreted here

as internalization of responsibility, was of particular value

:::.=

in understanding male guilt.

4.

The notion of congruent versus incongruent field independence/
locus of control types yielded no meaningful results.

S.

Empatey was negatively related to anxiety for males but not for
females, and negatively related to sex guilt for both sexes.
This may indicate that more empathic individuals tend to move
beyond rigid, conventional rules governing sexual behavior.

6. Religiosity was independent of anxiety for both sexes, but
strongly related to guilt, especially for males.

Overall, it

was the strongest predictor of guilt, perhaps due to the socioconventional quality of the Mosher scales.

7.

Sex differences were readily apparent.

The personality correlates

of guilt differed between the sexes, at least when the guilt
criterion differed for each sex.
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8.

The personality correlates of specific kinds of guilt showed
considerable variety.

Extensive research is needed to unravel

this complex phenomenon.
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73
Mosher Forced-Choice Guilt Inventory (for Men)
This questionnaire consists of a number of pairs of statements or
'~

opinions which have been given by college men in response to the "Mosher
Incomplete Sentences Test": These men were asked to complete phrases such
as ''When I tell a lie • • • " and 11 To kill in war

• " to make a sentence

which expressed their real feelings about the stem.

This questionna.ire

consists of the stems to which they responded and a pair of their responses
which are lettered A and B.
You are to read the stem and the pair of completions and decide
which you most agree with or which is most characteristic of you.

Your

choice, in each instance, should be in terms of what you believe, how yo,y.::
feel, or how you would react, and not in terms of how you think you should
believe, feel, or respond.
wrong answers.

This is

not a test.

There are no right or

Your choices should be a description of your own personal

beliefs, feelings, or reactions.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both completions
or neither completion to be characteristic of you.
the

~you~

In such cases select

strongly believe to be the case as far as you are concerned.

Be sure to find an answer

for every choice.

Do not omit an i tern even

though it is very difficult for you to decide, just select the more
characteristic member of the pair.
most agree

with.

Encircle the letter,

!

or

~'

which you
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1.

\o!hen I tell a lie • • •
A. it hurts.
B. I make it a good one.

2.

To kill in war • • •
A. is a job to be done.
B. is a shame but sometimes a necessity.

3 • Y.lomen who curse • • •
A.
B.

are nonnal.
make me sick.

...

4.

When anger builds inside me
A. I usually explode.
B. I keep ~ mouth shut.

5.

If I killed someone in self-defense, I • • •
A. would feel no anguish.
B. think it would trouble me the rest of rrry life.

6.

I punish myself • • •
A. for the evil I do.
B• very seldom for other people do it for me.
If in the future I committed adultery
A. I won't feel bad about it.
B. it would be sinful.

...

8. Obscene literature • • •
A.
B.

9.

is a sinful and corrupt business.
is fascinating reading.

11 Di.rty 11 jokes in mixed company • • •
A. are common in our town.
B. should be avoided.

10.

As a child, sex play •
A. never entered my mind.
B. is quite wide spread.

11.

I detest myself for • • •
A. my sins and failures.
B. for not having more exciting sexual experiences.

12.

Sex relations before marriage • • •
A. ruin many a happy couple.
B. are good in my opinion.

13.

If in the future I comrni tted adultery •
A. I wouldn't tell anyone.
B. I would probably feel bad about it.
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14.

'When I have sexual desires • • •
A. I usually try to curb them.
B. I generally satisfy them.

15.

If I killed someone in self-defense, I • • •
A. woul.dn' t enjoy it.
B. I'd be glad to be alive.

16. Unusual sex practices • • •
A.
B.

might be interesting.
don't interest me.

17.

If I felt like murdering someone • • •
A. I would be ashamed of myself.
B. I would try to cornm:i. t the perfect crime.

18.

If I hated my parents • • •
A. I would hate myself.
B. I would rebel at their every wish.

19. After an outburst of anger • • •
A.
B.

I usually feel quite a hi. t better.
I am sorry and say so.

20.

I punish Jey"self • • •
A. never.
B. by feeling nervous and depressed.

21.

Prostitution • • •
A. is a must.
B. breeds only evil.

22.

If I killed someone in self-defense, I • • •
A. would still be troubled by rrry conscience.
B. would consider myself lucky.

23.

When I tell a lie • • •
A. I'm angry with myself.
B. I mix it with truth and serve it like a l.fartini.

24.

As a child, sex play • • •
A. is not good for mental and emotional well being.
B. is natural and innocent.

25.

When someone swears at me • • •
A. I swear back.
B. it usually bothers me even if I don't show it.

26.

When I was youneer, fighting
A·
B.

was always a thrill.
disgusted me.

...
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27.

AS a child, sex play • • •

A.
B.

was a big taboo and I was deathly af'rafd of it.
was common without guilt feelings.

28.

After an argument • • •
A. I feel mean.
B. I am sorry f'or my actions.

29.

Dirty 1' jokes in mixed company • • •
A. are not proper.
B. are exciting and amusing.

30.

Unusual sex practices • • •
A. are awful and unthin.lmble.
B. are not so unusual to me.

31.

'When I have sex dreams • • •
A. I cannot remember them in the morning.
B. I wake up happy.

11

32 • 'When I was younger, fighting • • •
A· never appealed to me.
B. was :fun and frequent.
33·

One should not • • •
A. knowingly sin.
B. try to follow absolutes.

34.

To kill in war • • •
A· is good and meritable.
B. would be sickerri.ng to me.

3.5.

I detest myself' f'or • • •
A. nothing, I love life.
B. not being more nearly perfect.

36.

Dirty 11 jokes in mixed company • • •
A. are lots of run.
B. are coarse to say the least.
11

31· Petting • • •
A.
B.

38.

is something that should be controlled.
is a form of education.

After an argument • • •
A. I usually feel better.
B. I am disgusted that I allowed myself' to become involved.

39. Obscene literature • • •
A.
B.

should be freely published.
helps people become sexual perverts.

-----

11

40.

I regret • • •
A. my sexual experiences.
B. nothing I've ever done.

41. A guilty conscience • • •
A.
B.

does not bother me too much.
is worse than a sickness to me.

42.

If I felt like murdering someone • • •
A. it would be for good reason.
B. I'd think I was crazy.

43.

.Arguments leave me feeling
A. that it was a waste of time.
B. smarter.

44.

After a childhood fight, I felt • • •
miserable and made up afterwards.
like a hero.

A.
B.

45.

'When anger builds inside me • • •
A· I do my best to suppress it.
B. I have to blow off some steam.

46.

Unusual sex practices • • •
A. are O.K. as long as they're heterosexual.
B. usually aren't pleasurable because you have preconceived
feelings about their being wrong.

47.

I regret • • •

A.
B.

getting caught, but nothing else.
all of my sins.

48.

'When I tell a lie • • •
A. rrry conscience bothers me.
B. I wonder whether I 1 11 get away with it.

49.

Sex relations before marriage • • •
A. are practiced too much to be wrong.
B. in my opinion, should not be practiced.
I

5o.

As a child, sex play • • •
A. is dangerous.
B. is not harmful but does create sexual pleasure.

51.

When caught in the act • • •
A. I try to bluff rrry way out.
B. truth is the best policy.

52.

As a child sex play • • •
A. was indulged in.
B. is immature and ridiculous.
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53. When I tell a lie • • •
A.

it is an exception or rather an odd occurrence.

B. I tell a lie.

54.
55.

If I hated my parents • • •
I would be wrong, foolish, and feel guilty.
B. they would know it that's for sure!

A~

If I robbed a bank • • •
A. I would give up I suppose.
B. I probably would get away with it.

56. Arguments leave me feeling • • •
A.
B.

proud, they certainly are worthwhile.
depressed and disgusted.
·

57. When I have sexual desires • • •
A.
B.

58.

they are quite strong.
I attempt to repress them.

Sin and failure • • •
are two situations we try to avoid.
B. do not depress me for long.

A.

Sex relations before marriage • • •
A. help people to adjust.
B. should not be recommended.
60.

When anger builds inside me • • •
A. I .feel like killing somebody.
B. I get sick.

61.

If I robbed a bank
A. I would live like a king.
B. I should get caught.

62.

!~sturbation • • •

A.
B.

is a habit that should be controlled.
is very common.

63.

After an argument • • •
A. I feel proud in victory and understanding in defeat.
B. I am sorry and see no reason to stay mad.

64.

Sin and failure • • •
A. are the works of the Devil.
B. have not bothered me yet.

65.

If I committed a homosexual act •
A. it would be my business.
B. it would show weakness in me.
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66. When anger builds inside me • • •
A·
B.

I always express it.
I usually take it out on myself.

67. Prostitution • • •
A.

is a sign of moral decay in society.

B. is acceptable and needed qy some people.
68.

Capital punishment • • •
A. should be abo~i.shed.
B. is a necessity.

69.

Sex relations before marriage • • •
A. are O.K. if both partners are in agreement.
B. are dangerous.

70.

I tried to make amends • • •
A. for all rrry misdeeds, but I can't forget them.
B. but not if I could help it.

71.

After a childhood fight, I felt • • •
A. sorry.
B. mad and irritable.

72.

I detest myself for • • •
nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
B. thoughts I sometimes have.

A.

13· Arguments leave me feeling
A.
B.

satisfied usually.
exhausted.

74.

Masturbation • • •
A. is all right.
B. should not be practiced.

75.

After an argument • • •
A. • I usually feel good if I won.
B. it is best to apologize to clear the air.

76.

I hate • • •
A. sin.
B. m.oralis ts and "do gooders. n
'\

77.

Sex • • •
A. is a beautiful gift of God not to be cheapened.
B. is good and enjoyable.

78.

Capital punishment • • •
A. is not used often enough.
B. is legal murder, it is inhuman.

Bo
79.

Prostitution • • •
A. should be legalized.
B. cannot really afford enjoyment.

I
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Scoring Instructions for MOsher Scale
(MC
1. MC A
B

2.

HA
B

).

MCA
B

4.

HA
B

>·

HA
B

6. MC A
B

7-

SA
B

8. MCA
B

9·
lO.

SA
B

SA
B

11. MC A
B

12.

SA
B

1).

SA
B

14.

SA
B

15.

HA
B

= Morality-Conscience,

H = Hostility, and S = Sex)

+2
-2

16.

-1
+1

17.

-l
+2

18.

-2
+1

19.

-1
+2

20. MC A

+2
-2

21.

-2
+2

22.

+2
-2

2). MC A

-l
+1

24.

+1
-1

25.

+2
-2

26.

+2
-2

27.

-1
+1

28.

+l
-2

29.

+1
-2

)0.

-2
+l

)l.

+2
-2

32 •. H A

+2
-2

33· MC A

-1
+2

34-

-2
+2

35.

-2
+2

)6.

+2
-2

37.

+2
-2

38.

+2
-2

39.

-2
+1

40. MC A

-2
+2

41.

+2
-2

42.
43·

B

-2
+2

SA

+1

44.

B

-2

SA

+2
-2

SA
B

HA
B

HA
B

HA
B
B

SA
B

HA
B

B

SA
B

HA
B

HA
B

SA
B

HA

B

SA
B
B

B

+l
-2
+2
-2

HA· -2
B +2
MCA
B

SA
B

SA
B

HA
B
I~

A
B
B

MC A
B

HA
B

HA
B

HA
B

45.

+1
-2

HA
B

-2
+2
-2
+l
........,
+1
-l
-l
+2
-2
+2
+2
-2
-1
+2
-1
+2
+1
-l
+2
-2
+2
-l

82
46.

SA
B

47.

MCA
B

48.

MC A
B

49.

SA
B

5o.

SA
B

51.

MC A
B

52.

SA
B

53.

MC A
B

54.

HA
B

55.

MC A
B

56.

HA
B

-1
+1

62.

-2
+2

6).

+2
-2

64.

-1
+1

65.

+2
-2

66.

-2
+1

67.

-1
+1

68.

+1
-1

69.

+2
-2

70.

+1
-2

71.

-2
+2

72.

SA
B

HA
B

MC A
B

SA
B

HA
B

SA
B

HA
B

SA
B

MCA
B

HA
B

MC A
B

+1
-1

78.

-1
+1

19·

57.
58.
59.

73·

B

-2
+1

MCA

+1

74·

SA

B

-1

SA

-2
+1

75.

HA

-2
+2

76.

-2
+2

77.

SA

B

6o.

HA
B

61.

MC A
B

+1
-1
-2
+2
+2
-2
+1
-2
-1
+2

-1

+1
-1

B

+2

HA

+2
-2

B

B

+2
-2

B

SA

-1

+1

-2
+2

-1

B

SA

-1
+1

+1

B

-2
+2

B

+2
-2

\

HA

HA

+1
-2

---

Items of the Rotter I-E Scale Scored for Mirels 1 Factor I

5- a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b.

Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades
are influenced b.1 accidental happenings.

10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if
ever such a thing as an unfair test.

b.

Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course

work that studying is really useless.

11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little
b.

or nothing to do with it.
Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place
at the right time.
\

15. a. In rrry case getting what I want has little or nothing to do
b.

with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to do b.1 fiipping
a coin.

16. a. Who gets
b.

to be the ooss often depends on who was lucky enoug_l)._

to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability,
luck has little or nothing to do with it.

18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are
b.

controlled b,y accidental happenings.
There is really no such thing as "luck."

23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades
b.

25. a.
b.

28. a.
b.

they give.
There is a dire~t connection between how hard I study and the
grades I get.
Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things

that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays
an important role in my life.
'Wha.t happens to me is rrry own doing.

Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the
direction my life is taking.

Note: The underlined alternative is scored in the external direction.
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Hogan Empathy Scale
(Answers scored for empathy are noted in parentheses.}
1.

A person needs to "show off" a little now and then.

2.

I liked "Alice in Wonderland" by Lewis Carroll.

3·

Clever, sarcastic people make me feel very uncomfortable.

4.

I usually take an active part in the entertainment at parties.

5.

I feel sure that there is only one true religion.

6. I
7.

am afraid of deep water.

(T}

(T)
(F)
(T)

(F)

(F)

I must admit I often try to get my own way regardless of what others
(F)

may want.

nw

8.

I have at one time or another in
writing. (T)

9·

Most of the arguments or quarrels I get into are over matters of
principle. (T)

life tried my hand at poetry
--~~- -·

10. I would like the job of foreign correspondent for a newspaper.

(T)

11.

People today have forgotten how to feel properly ashamed of themselves. (F)

12.

I prefer a shower to a bathtub.

13.

I always try to consider the other fellow's feelings before I do
something. (T)

14.

I usually don 1 t like to talk much unless I am with people I know
very well. (F)

15.

I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.

(T)

16. I like to keep people guessing what I'm going to

{T)

do next.

(F)

17.

Pefore I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to
it. (T}

18.

I like to talk before groups of people.

19.

l.Jhen a man is with a woman he is usually thinking about things
related to her sex. (F)

20.

Only a fool would try to change our American way of life.

(T)

(F)
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21.

}oty parents lvere always very strict and stern with me.

22.

Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things
I'm not supposed to do. {T)

23.

I think I would like to belong to a singing club.

24.

I think I am usually a leader in my group.

25.

I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
(F)

26.

I don't like to work on a problem unless there is the possibility
or coming out with a clear-cut non-ambiguous answer. (F)

27.

It oothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily
routine. {F)

28.

I have a natural talent for influencing people.

29.

I don't really care whether people like me or dislike me.

30.

The trouble with many people is that they don't take things seT:heusly
enough. (F)

31.

It is hard for me just to sit still and relax.

32.

Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.

33·

I feel that it is certainly best to keep my mouth shut when I'm in
trouble. (F)

34. I am a good mixer.

35·
37.
38.

(T)

(T)

{T)
(F)

{F)
(F)

(T)

I am an important person.

36. I like poetry.

(F)

(F)

(T)

}tr feelings are not easily hurt.

(F)

I have met problems so full of possibilities that I have been unable
{T)

• to make up my mind about them.

39·

Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy.

40. What others think of me does not bother me.

41.

I would like to be a journalist.

42.

I like to talk about sex.

{F)

(F)

(T)

(T)

43· Jtr way of doing things is apt

to be mis\Ulderstood by others·

{F)
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44.

Sometimes without any reason or even when things are going wrong I
feel excitedly happy, "on top of the world. 11 (T)

4.5.

I like to be with a crowd who play jokes on one another.

46.

t-ty mother or father often made me obey even when I thought that it
was unreasonable. (F)

47· I easily become impatient with people.

48.

(T)

(F).

Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love.

(T)

49. I tend to

be interested in several different hobbies rather than to
stick to one of them for a long time. {T)

.5o.

I am not easily angered.

.51.

People have often misunderstood IIT'J intentions when I was trying to
put them right and be helpful. {F)

(T)

I am usually calm and not easily upset.

(T)

I would certainly enjoy beating a crook at his own game.

(T)

I am often so annoyed '\-Then someone tries to get ahead of me in a
line of people that I speak to him about it. (F)

.5.5.

I used to like hopscotch.

56.

I have never ooen made especially nervous over trouble that arry
members of my family have gotten into. (F)

57·

As a rule I have little difficulty in "putting rnyself into other
people's shoes. 11 (T)

.58.

I have seen some things so sad that I almost felt like crying.

59·

Disobedience to the government is never justified.

6o.

It is the duty of a citizen to support his countr'IJ, right or wrong.

61.

I am usually rather short-tempered with people who come around and
bother me with foolish questions. (F)

62.

I have a pretty clear idea of what I would try to impart to rrry
students if I were a teacher. (T)

(F)

(T)

(F)

(F)

63. I enjoy the company of strong-willed people.

(T)

64. I frequently undertake more than I can accomplish.

(T)
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Measure of Religiosi ~
1.

How often have you attended religious services during the past year?
a) Never.
b) A few times.
c) About once a month.
d) A few times a month.
e) Weekly.

2.

Which or the following best describes your practice or prayer or
religious meditation?
a) Prayer is a regular part of my daily life.
b) I usually pray in times of stress or need but rarely
at any other time.
c) I pray only during formal ceremonies.
d) Prayer has little importance in my life.
e) I never pray.

3. When you have a serious personal problem how often do you take
religious advice or teaching into consideration?
a) .Alinost always.
b) Usually.
c} Sometimes.
d) Rarely.
e) Never.

---·

4.

How much of an influence would you say that religion has on the way
that you choose to act and the way that you choose to spend your
time each day?
a} No influence.
b) A small influence.
c} Some influence.
d) A fair amount of influence.
e) A large influence.

5.

Which of the following statements comes closest to your belief about
God?
a} I am sure that God really exists and that He is active in
rrry life.
b) Although I sometimes question His existence, I do believe
in God and believe He knows of me as a person.
c) I don't know if there is a personal God, but I do believe
in a higher power of some kind.
d) I don't know if there is a personal God or a higher power
of some kind, and I don't know if I will ever know.
e) I don't believe in a personal God or in a higher power.

6. whlch of the following statements comes closest to your belief about
life after death (i.mmortali ty)?
a} I believe in a personal life after death, a soul existing as
a specific individual.
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b)
c)
d)
e)

I believe in a soul existing after \death as a part of a
universal spirit.
I believe in a life after death of some kind, but I really
don 1 t know what it would be like.
I don 1 t know whether there is any kind of life after death,
and I don 1 t know if I will ever know.
I don't believe in any kind of life after death.

1·

During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of
religious reverence or devotion?
a) Almost daily.
b) Frequently.
c) Sometimes.
d) Rarely.
e) Never.

8.

D:> you agree with the following statement?

"Religion gives me a
great amount of comfort and security in life. 11
a) Strongly disagree.
b) Disagree.
c) Uncertain.
d) Agree.
e) Strongly agree.
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